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How are we to understand and explain Trump, Orban, 
Brexit, the League, the Alternative for Germany, and so 
on, the ‘earthquake’ that has shaken the political systems 
of Europe and the USA? In liberal commentary, ‘populism’ 
has been the predominant way of grasping and opposing the 
phenomenon. Marco Revelli’s The New Populism goes beyond 
this liberal commonsense in a careful, thorough portrait of 
this multifaceted object, drawing together a wide range of 
data and argumentation to provide, as William Davies notes 
in a back-cover endorsement, ‘The first definitive analysis of 
post-2008 populism’. 
Certainly, this is the most expansive, sober treatment of 
the object to date, I think. It is full of detail on populism’s 
constituencies, as well as some daring and compelling 
interpretative suggestions. Nevertheless, an immediate 
objection concerns the guiding concept itself. As Marco 
d’Eramo has noted, the term, used with increasing frequency 
since the collapse of ‘really existing socialism’, is highly 
politicised. It is used as a contrast to a reasonable, consensual 
liberal centre, a brake on the imagination of alternatives. 
Resonant with class hatred, populism connotes fears of a 
‘mob’ or ‘rabble’, viewed as virulent, aggressive, and irrational.1 
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Revelli is well aware of these issues, the emptying of the term, its use to 
condemn everything challenging consensual neoliberalism, and of the way 
‘populism’ is used—like ‘totalitarianism’—to equate far right and far left.
Still, he goes with it. ‘Populism’ is never clearly defined. Revelli briefly 
looks at the history of the term and the difficulties of definition, and 
arrives, ambiguously, at a more recent, three-featured ideal type: (1) the 
people as an organic entity, set against an extraneous, hostile element—an 
above-and-below logic; (2) the notion of betrayal, with political conflict 
interpreted primarily in moral terms; and (3) an imaginary of upheaval, an 
upheaval necessary for the restoration of popular sovereignty. Throughout 
these early pages, a cautious and variegated approach is suggested: a 
distinction between ‘populism as context’ or ‘generic mood’ and ‘populism 
as project’; a note on populism’s ‘various souls’; the inherent interlinking of 
populism and democracy; and a distinction, despite congruencies, between 
our populism—populism 2.0—and its 19th-century antecedents.2 In the 
end, Revelli settles on populism as an ‘impalpable entity’: ‘It is a formless 
form that social malaise and impulses to protect take on in societies that 
have been pulverised and reworked by globalization and total finance . . . in 
the era in which there is a lack of voice or organization’.3 While a culturalist 
emphasis on atmosphere or ‘structures of feelings’ seems vital, the concept 
remains troubling, especially in the way it sections off a much wider far-
right atmosphere that belongs together with the formal political forces of 
the right that Revelli focuses on. 
When it comes to the latter, Revelli’s analysis is brilliant and convincing. 
It is also wide-ranging, with chapters devoted to Trump, to Brexit, to 
France, to Germany, to the ‘Third Europe’ (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic, and Austria), and to Italy (a ‘collective laboratory’ 
of populism).4 Across these cases, Revelli insists on the power of maps in 
thinking through to whom populism is appealing and why. Exploring the 
2  Marco Revelli, The New Populism: Democracy Stares into the Abyss (London: Verso, 
2019), 26. 
3  The New Populism, 11. 
4  The New Populism, 32.
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‘Trumpocalypse’, Revelli underscores the pivotal interpretative pairing 
of centre and periphery, Clinton taking the centres of metropolitan 
America by a wide margin, Trump triumphing in rural areas and in small 
and provincial cities. This was not, as is often suggested, a revolt of the 
poor; Clinton led easily with those earning under $30,000 per annum, 
and Trump had a clear advantage among those earning over $50,000, this 
advantage especially pronounced among those earning between $100,000 
and $200,000. What the vote represented was more like ‘the revenge of 
those who had been divested of something’: ‘their male privilege, part of 
their (however high) income, their societal status, recognition of their 
work, respect for their faith or their country, their place in the world, their 
power, their hegemony’.5 Those posited as doing the divesting are various: 
Finance, the banks, the ‘swamp’ of Washington, gays and lesbians and 
transgender people, Hollywood celebrities with no morals, the Hispanics 
who eat in their gardens, the Blacks who drop empty bottles in the streets, 
Muslims who have more faith than they do, the Arab oil magnates who 
buy up their cities and finance the throat-cutters.6 
Place and class are intertwined here with race and gender, Trump winning 
67 percent of the non-college-educated white vote against Clinton’s 28 
percent, and only 37 percent of women against Clinton’s 54 percent. 
Certain convergences and discrepancies are to be found across the 
other populist case studies. Brexitland converges with a map of UK 
Independence Party support—weak in wealthy London, strong in sparsely 
populated peripheries as well as in medium and large cities with the 
‘deepest industrial roots’, those that have been hardest hit by neoliberal 
transformations and austerity; weak among the young and more educated, 
strongest in areas where wages were lowest and public services less available, 
and among skilled and semi-skilled manual workers.7 In France, Paris and 
5  The New Populism, 72–73. 
6  The New Populism, 73. 
7  The New Populism, 87. 
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other large cities showed little openness to Marine Le Pen, although the 
vote share of the National Front (renamed National Rally in June 2018) 
has advanced significantly across the electorate and has increased its appeal 
with blue-collar workers, the less-educated, and those on lower wages. The 
map of Alternative for Germany support, meanwhile, once more signals 
the angst of the peripheries, with greater support generated in the east, in 
lower-density areas, among older citizens, the less educated, those on lower 
incomes, and men, alongside some exceptions in westward areas with high 
levels of manufacturing. The harder-right and more successful populists of 
the ‘Third Europe’ are treated more briefly by Revelli, but their support 
conforms to the predominant patterns already noted. 
Revelli turns at some length to Italy, his homeland. With Berlusconi’s 
1994 electoral victory, Italy was an early laboratory of populism, until 
recently governed by the peculiar ‘bipolar’ populist coalition between 
the anti-establishment Five Star Movement and the far-right League. The 
Italian case draws our attention to a crucial feature of the post-Global 
Financial Crisis populist earthquake: the devastation of the mainstream 
parties of both the centre-right and centre-left. Beginning earlier in Italy 
with the political scandals that engulfed the mainstream parties in the early 
1990s, the general crisis of the centrist parties is pivotal in the rhetoric of 
the populists who set themselves against this supposedly distant cartel of 
political elites. Connected to commentary on the rise of ‘anti-politics’ in the 
West in the 1990s, and to contemporary discussions of post-politics and 
post-democracy (falling voter turnout, declining party membership, and 
growing distrust of politicians, bureaucrats, and parties), this is precisely 
the moment specified by Gramsci as hegemonic crisis: where ‘social groups 
become detached from their traditional parties’; in which:
The traditional parties . . . are no longer recognized by their class (or 
fraction of a class) as its expression. When such crises occur, the immediate 
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situation becomes delicate and dangerous, because the field is open for 
violent solutions, for the activities of unknown forces, represented by 
charismatic ‘men of destiny’.8
 
The erosion of the old ‘political containers’ (political homelessness the 
result) is a significant factor in Revelli’s explanatory repertoire.9 On one 
score, then, populism is a ‘senile disorder of democracy’, provoked by a 
‘deficit of representation’.10 This, though, is intimately tied to the effects of 
neoliberal globalisation: the déclassement of the middle class (the ‘ballast’ of 
the formerly stable and moderate Western political sphere); the pulverisation 
of secure work; class disaggregation; class war from above and the massive 
polarisation it has engendered (a €120 billion a year shift of wealth from 
wages to profits in the West between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s); 
and the entrenchment of oligarchy.11 All of this has left a disoriented mass 
of people ‘consigned to resentment and rancour’. These people experience 
a ‘diffuse feeling of rage, unease and suspicion’ and are without an available 
language to map these feelings to social conditions; they are prepared to 
‘entrust themselves to a winner’, that is, to those who ‘stand up above’.12 
Despite his quite mordant tone throughout, for Revelli, populism, the 
‘awkward guest’ at the liberal-democratic party, might at least get us talking 
again about redistribution, social services, and wages, of a reformism that 
‘now seems so “revolutionary”’.13 
8  Antonio Gramsci, The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935 (New York: 
New York University Press, 2000), 217–218.
9  The New Populism, 10. 
10  The New Populism, 3, 4. 
11  The New Populism, 200. 
12  The New Populism, 202, 203. 
13  The New Populism, 30, 204. 
